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Abstract  
This article refers to carbon valuation as the practice of ascribing value to, and 
assessing the value of, actions and objects in terms of carbon emissions. Due 
to the pervasiveness of carbon emissions in the actions and objects of everyday 
lives of human beings, the making of carbon offsets and credits offers almost 
unlimited repertoires of alternatives to be included in contemporary carbon 
valuation schemes. Consequently, the article unpacks how discussions of 
carbon valuation are interpreted through different registers of alternatives—as 
the commensuration and substitution of variants on the one hand, and the 
confrontational comparison of radical difference on the other. Through the 
reading of a wide selection of the social science literature on carbon markets 
and trading, the article argues that the value of carbon emissions itself depends 
on the construction of alternative, hypothetical scenarios, and that emissions 
have become both a moral and a virtual measure pitting diverse forms of 
actualised actions or objects against each other or against corresponding non-
actions and non-objects as alternatives. 
Key words: carbon credits; value; alternative; commensuration; climate 
change; market 
Introduct ion 
What does toasting 70 slices of bread have in common with heating 23 
meals in the microwave? Allegedly the energy consumed by either of 
these actions emits as much CO2 as the difference between choosing to 
drive 10 km in a car instead of travelling the same distance by bus in 
Denmark. These were the figures communicated in a 2012 advertising 
campaign called ‘Become world saviour’, which was conducted by the 
Danish bus company Midttrafik.  1
 In Danish: bliv verdensredder.1
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These rather innocent comparisons of mundane actions in terms of 
their quantified emissions appear frequently in explanations of how 
measurements and control of CO2—or ‘carbon’ as it is often referred 
to in everyday English usage—is central to achieving greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emission reductions. As such, the comparisons point to the 
pervasiveness of what I here refer to as ‘carbon valuation’. I take this 
to be the economic and moral assessment and ascription of value to 
objects and actions based on their impact on the global climate 
measured in terms of carbon emissions,  and the purpose of this article 2
is to study how such comparisons constructed by carbon valuation are 
interpreted through different registers of alternatives. The bus 
company uses emission comparisons that are recognisable to Danish 
citizens as a marketing ploy, and it is exactly their recognisability that 
demonstrates how pervasive carbon valuation can be, when everyday 
actions can be assessed in terms of a universal emissions denominator. 
The question is: what is performed by the comparison and which logic 
is behind the operation? My argument is that even though the 
intention of the bus company is one of illustrating the climate costs of 
some actions compared to others, it exemplifies how the logic of 
carbon valuation builds upon the potentiality of substituting different 
alternative actions for each other. In this way, it addresses one of the 
central operations behind carbon valuation, namely an alternation 
between actions and non-actions, objects and non-objects, actual and 
potential that simultaneously plays on commensuration and 
differentiation of these alternatives (Dalsgaard 2014). 
To approach the topic of carbon valuation, I look at two different 
understandings of alternative that can be discerned in the social science 
debates about carbon markets and credits and their potential for 
commensuration. These are alternative in the sense of being a variant 
of the same kind, where one can substitute for the other, and 
alternative in the sense of being an option that promises to be a 
radically different and incommensurable alternative to something. The 
meaning of the notion of ‘alternative’ is that it always requires a 
distinction of two realities, one deemed altered and the other 
unaltered, one chosen and the other not chosen. They are in principle 
mutually exclusive. For carbon valuation, however, there is a process 
of alternation between the altered and the unaltered (the ‘business as 
usual’), where at times they are brought to be commensurable and at 
other times not depending on the circumstances and the actors 
involved.  
This substitution of emissions finds its most visible form in carbon 
markets and carbon credits, which refer to one actor’s purchase of 
emission permits, constructed from another actor’s ‘promises’ not to 
emit. Promises refer to alternative intended reality of actions or 
 This is measured as ‘global warming potential’ with the base unit being one tonne 2
of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2e).
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material forms that do not yet exist (and may never come into 
existence). In order for them to reduce emissions, they must be 
somehow actualised. This means that the virtual emissions (established 
by a contract or other ‘certified promises’ of action or non-action) and 
the actual emissions are not only compared; their value is also made 
commensurate via trading with the consequence that the virtual and 
the potential impacts on the actual and the real (see Lohmann 2011). 
One could argue that promises always do that, although rarely in a 
linear and directly exchangeable way (cf. Beckert 2016). That is 
nonetheless the case when carbon valuation allows for the trade of 
actual with ‘hypothetical’ future emissions and ascribes value to 
potential scenarios at par with actual scenarios across global space and 
time. This way of dealing in alternatives results in carbon being 
identified and measured in all the material forms within which this 
atom might be embedded (in the ground, in forests, etc.), and in the 
actions that affect these material forms. Carbon valuation thus offers 
endless opportunities for discovering alternatives between carbon-
emitting actions, and it relies on breaking down any ontological 
separation between the actual and the virtual.  
In what follows, I approach the topic of alternatives with 
inspiration from Bill Maurer’s (2005) notion of lateral reasoning and 
his discussion of alternative currencies. Laterality refers to how 
ethnographic work (but also other forms of social‒scientific activity 
such as the making of carbon credits) may not provide a meta-
perspective, but lies ‘alongside’ the social world and the relation 
between representation and ‘reality’ that it tries to analyse. Maurer 
demonstrates this by focusing on attempts by individuals and 
institutions to employ alternative currencies to forge anew an 
‘adequate’ connection between monetary and economic value on the 
one hand and the social reality this value aims to represent on the 
other. The article is thus largely a scholarly commentary, where 
different positions on carbon trading are discussed in light of carbon 
valuation and the creation of alternatives. I will begin by outlining 
how the topic of alternatives can be approached with inspiration from 
Maurer. This inspiration will lead to a look at the limits to alternatives 
(around notions of incommensurability), then to the importance of 
certifications and materiality for establishing the commensuration or 
conversely the separation of the actual and the virtual, and lastly to 
how carbon credits are thus a matter of ‘adequate’ representations. 
Lateral Reasoning and Alternatives 
Since any conception of an alternative necessarily depends on its being 
different from what it is an alternative to, it also has to rely on a 
discussion of ‘difference’. This is one of the underlying themes of 
Maurer’s (2005) book, which draws upon the way that anthropology 
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(and North American anthropology in particular) has relied on 
‘otherness’ or difference as one of its main tropes, although to Maurer 
it is a matter of what constitutes currencies as ‘different’ from each 
other. Anthropological discussions in the 1980s and 1990s tried to 
strip cultural difference of any sort of essentialism and avoid taking its 
boundaries for granted in ethnographic descriptions and analyses. Still, 
anthropologists have had difficulties escaping the view of cultures in 
plural as radically different and incommensurable since is difficult to 
identify a neutral and non-partial vantage point, when the researchers 
themselves are in a position characterised by difference from what they 
investigate. Much anthropology relies on cultural phenomena as a 
multiplicity of differences (there are different cultures, different values, 
etc., each with its own history and context), which implies that the 
phenomena that are different are of one kind (e.g. they are all 
cultures). Difference thus becomes a matter of degree, and the 
phenomena are to some extent ‘complementary’ (see Maurer 2005: 
25); variants of an otherwise homologous type. Instead of getting 
entangled in debating cultural relativism, Maurer’s approach is first 
and foremost empirical—to understand the expressions of difference in 
the many voices and views of his material. Yet, to do this he also 
proposes in line with a tradition of thinking from Bergson and Deleuze 
to locate difference ‘within the realm of the potential’ (ibid.: 12). If one 
considers difference as having a temporal and emergent character—as 
difference being in kind as a virtual and continuous multiplicity—then 
difference points to a multiplicity of reality that becomes non-essential 
and non-static. ‘Virtual reality’ can be distinguished from ‘possible 
reality’, where ‘the latter [is] always taking the form of the real while 
the former’s actualization puts into question that prefiguration as it 
continually multiplies’ (ibid.: 13). Difference is thus not a matter of 
comparing distinct and enumerable entities (a static number of 
‘different cultures’) but allows Maurer to think ‘laterally’ alongside his 
interlocutors. This move involves sensitivity to the way a research 
approach is intertwined with that of the interlocutors, where difference 
and sameness ‘alternates’ (in the sense of ‘oscillation’ or ‘circulation’), 
and it allows one to think of a non-static potential ‘alternative 
to’ (which implies the question of whether the phenomenon being 
studied is adequately conceptualised as a matter of for example 
‘culture’ or ‘value’). 
Thinking alongside but also ‘across’ to radical difference—letting 
carbon valuation circulate or alternate between oppositions—can in 
turn help us question the meanings of ‘alternative’ under specific 
circumstances (Maurer 2005: 16). The notion of radical difference 
implies incommensurability and irreducibility, whereas alternative in 
the sense of variant implies substitutability. Both of those meanings—
and the relationship between them—are important to take into 
consideration in order to take lateral reasoning about carbon valuation 
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seriously. How do carbon valuation practices and the actions they 
value become commensurate and thus substitutable variants? How do 
alternatives become radically different? The calculative techniques and 
measurements behind the making of credits, offsets, or actions that 
need to be offset, are supposed to impose commensurability and thus 
alternation in the sense of substitutability across a wide range of 
carbon-emitting actions and processes. For example, the comparisons 
in the beginning of the introduction are contained within the reasoning 
of a system of market-based carbon valuation—that different forms of 
emissions become commensurable and substitutable for one another 
across space and time (cf. Knox-Hayes 2010, 2013) —even if it is 3
unclear to what extent actions relating to cooking and transport really 
substitute for each other in anyone’s everyday life. 
Carbon Markets and Commensuration of Dif ference 
Carbon trading and carbon markets basically come in two types. 
Compliance markets are created from national, regional or 
international regulations that impose caps or limits on emissions from 
industry. In order to avoid fines, industrial actors covered by these 
regulations can trade for extra credits, or they can sell their own excess 
credits. Voluntary markets are driven by demand from corporations 
with marketing strategies of corporate social responsibility but also 
from private consumers wanting to reduce their carbon footprints.  
Both types of markets rely upon alternatives at different conceptual 
scales and parameters, and they promise to put into place several 
alternative futures: global warming mitigation, ‘green’ or ‘clean’ 
capitalism, revaluation of nature, human action, energy and so on (e.g. 
Bridge 2010; Newell and Paterson 2010; Newell et al. 2012). These are 
alternatives in the sense that they articulate possible trajectories that 
are considered as significantly different from the path undertaken by 
reality if left unaltered. Emission markets are first and foremost the 
outcome and performance of economic politics and it has been argued 
that, as such, they displace conflict and shift focus from pollution and 
responsibility to the technical rules of an incentives mechanism. 
Carbon trading might prove not very successful in fighting climate 
change, but as argued by Donald MacKenzie it is successful in 
‘technicizing’ the politics of allocation and valuation of emission 
allowances (MacKenzie 2008: 6). The economic logic behind carbon 
markets builds on the assumption that GHGs affect the earth’s climate 
equally no matter where the emission takes place (e.g. Grubb 2003: 
 In fact, ‘emissions reductions have neither real space nor real time because the 3
emission never occurs. The reduction is rather a mere reflection of the counterfactual, 
of what might have otherwise occurred. Both its space and time must be constructed’ 
(Knox-Hayes 2010: 956).
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146; Victor and House 2004: 56; Yamin 2005: xxix).  This reduces the 4
problem of climate change to the problem of how to value and price 
carbon emissions (and other GHGs) correctly (see Grubb 2003; Stern 
2006). More importantly for my argument, it enables alternation to 
operate through a global substitutability of a carbon credit for that 
which has to be offset or credited; of one tonne of CO2 for any other 
(or for an amount of CH4 or another GHG that can be calculated to 
have the same effect on the climate as one tonne of CO2).  
When emissions trading is based on this logic of substitution, then 
one actual action in one part of the world is both in theory and in 
economic practice made commensurable with, and alternative to, some 
other action, which emits, reduces or promises not to emit an 
equivalent amount of GHG. Both the operations behind the mundane 
substitutions mentioned in the introduction, and the alternative 
‘environmentally friendly’ capitalism that they entail, are often seen as 
condemning nature to be valued in economic terms, which excludes 
other forms of value that may be incommensurable with economic 
logic (Dalsgaard 2013). That is, valuing actions in this way does 
encounter resistance, because these actions are carried out by actors 
who value what they do for reasons (socially or culturally) that are not 
always reducible to a single measure of worth—they can be 
alternatives to each other in ways that rather express radical 
difference. To examine the depths of such critiques, I will briefly 
discuss how they as alternatives relate to the notion of 
commensuration in the sense of a process or ‘a system for discarding 
information and organising what remains into new forms’ (Espeland 
and Stevens 1998: 317).  
Maurer does not explicitly mention commensuration, but it is 
nonetheless inherent to his work through discussions of for instance 
equivalence. Commensuration is for Wendy Espeland and Mitchell 
Stevens (1998) regarded as a form of valuation that creates relations 
between objects that are compared but also has the power to 
transform that to which it is compared (see also Muniesa 2012: 26). It 
can turn qualities into quantities and difference into magnitude 
(Espeland and Stevens 1998: 317). It has been argued that operations 
of commensuration of the carbon markets can translate into ‘making 
things the same’ (MacKenzie 2009). Radical difference is discarded 
when a specific action becomes stripped of context and represented in 
quantified form as an amount of carbon emitted—a new form where 
initial difference is no longer recognised.  
Radical difference implies incommensurability, but its definition 
and its process of creation still depends upon a reference to its 
 Location (horizontally or vertically in the atmosphere) and timing (e.g. season) of 4
emissions actually do matter for the global warming potential in specific chemical, 
physical and meteorological environments, which is something designers of carbon 
markets have tended to ignore (Berntsen et al. 2006).
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opposite terms—and, therefore, a relation towards that to which it 
claims to be incommensurable. Drawing upon the work of Vivian 
Zelizer, Espeland and Stevens argue that: 
the importance of incommensurable categories […] depends […] on the relative 
status of their oppositional form, commensuration. The extension of 
commensuration into more spheres of life may make incommensurable categories 
more meaningful, their defense more necessary. This extension may produce 
paradoxical effects, as when pricing children in law, labour and insurance shifted 
the terms of their value from primarily economic to moral and emotional. 
Children became priceless. (Espeland and Stevens 1998: 327)  
It is difficult to say, for carbon trading, whether claims to pricelessness 
are strategic forms of political resistance (as in the critiques mentioned 
above) or inherently tied to the pricing of emissions. When emissions 
are priced and traded in voluntary markets for instance, one can 
suppose the existence of actors who prefer paying for credits rather 
than reducing their emissions. These ‘preferences’ may include private 
habits or routines that are deemed unavoidable or difficult to put a 
price on, but which can be preserved by pricing emissions instead.  
This discussion of alternatives as either commensurable or not 
opens for a nuanced understanding of the carbon trading schemes as 
valuations in several different ways by making ‘use of contrasts and 
differences, to gain insights from incomparability and inade-
quacy’ (Schmidt 2008: 357). Part of what becomes clear from this 
lateral alternation is that valuation is as much created in the 
conversion or in the comparison of alternatives. It is not solely 
discernible as an ascribed quality stemming from how people consider 
it (e.g. its social and symbolic value), or a matter of the inherent 
affordances of the object valued (such as its material properties), 
which has been the two main positions in the debates about the value 
of currencies (see Maurer 2005). Value stems from the act of 
considering and valuing. That is, the focus shifts to valuation as a 
performed action or practice (Muniesa 2012). Exemplary here is how 
Heather Lovell (2014) draws upon Espeland and Stevens and other 
sociological literature on standards to discuss the process of making 
financial accounting standards for emission allowances in the UK. 
Problems with the work of commensuration and standardisation 
appeared in this sector because there was no certain ideal or normal 
mode of valuing the emission allowances (ibid.: 8‒9). Some of Lovell’s 
respondents aimed at a stabilisation of the emission categories, while 
others expected the categories to constantly evolve and sought what 
was practically feasible in the specific local embeddedness of markets. 
It is easy to think that another part of the reason for the difficulty is 
that the measurement of emissions affords an almost unlimited process 
of substituting alternative actions for one another, which I will return 
to in the next section. 
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Carbon valuation encounters resistance when exposed in this way 
to entities that are difficult to quantify, or refuse to be reduced to an 
emission value at all, when quantity itself becomes a quality of things 
(Maurer 2006: 25), or where the commensuration is fraught either 
morally or in terms of what is accounted for. As Elizabeth Povinelli has 
noted about language use, ‘incommensurability refers to a state in 
which two phenomena (or worlds) cannot be compared by a third 
without producing serious distortion’ (2001: 320). Indeed Janelle 
Knox-Hayes has noted about the effects of carbon valuation schemes 
that ‘the assumptions and frames of accounting have a significant and 
often distorting influence on the evaluation of greenhouse gas 
impact.’ (Knox-Hayes 2013: 122), because ‘the markets account for 
neither information complexity nor spatial scale and temporal 
duration under which environmental systems operate’ (ibid.: 125; see 
also MacKenzie 2009; Bastian 2012). Knox-Hayes’s overall point is 
that the financialisation of carbon emissions is a form of time–space 
compression, which divorces the use value of resources associated with 
the carbon emitted from the exchange value of the financial 
instruments (credits). This entails a separation of exchange value from 
its material context (nature), which creates distortions and demands 
for accelerated rates of resource production out of line with the 
natural processes underwriting production—even if carbon trading 
was meant to solve the discrepancy between human economic activity 
and build-up of GHGs in the atmosphere. 
In the following sections, I will pursue some of these themes in 
more detail and discuss how they relate to carbon valuation as 
alternatives. This includes valuation from making commensurability 
between credits but also the defence of the incommensurability of 
actions and practices associated with or represented by carbon 
emissions. As a result, the discussion will begin with the exploration of 
carbon valuation’s limits through the markets.  
Carbon Markets and Limits to Subst i tut ions? 
Marketisation of carbon emissions would avert global warming by 
making it profitable not to emit GHGs. This has been the position of 
liberal economists like Nicholas Stern, who argue that climate change 
is the result of a market failure and of the failure of taking into 
account the full (environmental‒economic) costs of human activity and 
impact on climate (Stern 2006). A starting point for economic thinking 
is then to consider what it could mean to take into account the ‘full’ 
costs. Is it necessary or even possible to think about full 
commensuration? And would this deny any space for alternatives to 
economic carbon valuations? Carbon (the atom) is so pervasive—it is 
the basis for life itself, and all human (and many non-human) actions 
emit carbon—that it may be just as important to explore the limits to 
carbon valuation, and ask what it is not an alternative to. Since every 
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human action requires energy, which then causes the emission of 
various amounts of CO2, it could be difficult to identify the limits of 
what should count as carbon emissions. In the end it seems like a 
practical problem of what is measurable and at what aggregate scale of 
significance. What one makes of carbon (as a credit, as a form of value 
or a form of valuation) depends on what scale and what comparison 
one mobilises when trying to describe it and understand it (Simons et 
al. 2014). 
The permeability of carbon allows for the construction of the 
global scale needed for carbon trading to work in the liberal 
economist’s rhetoric about climate change. Where emissions circulate 
in the atmosphere, the markets promise an equal circulation of carbon 
in the form of credits. It seems pertinent to take the dual permeability 
of carbon seriously and follow emissions—laterally—across as many 
social and natural divides as possible to identify where and how 
carbon valuation happens, and in what way alternatives are generated 
and juxtaposed. When economists insist that carbon trading should be 
global, because ‘from an atmospheric standpoint’ carbon emissions 
know no boundaries and location of emissions do not matter (despite 
the scientific evidence to the contrary ), then neither should our 5
analysis be deterred by the differentiation enacted by boundaries, but 
should rather pay attention to how carbon valuation both constructs 
and deconstructs them, and how the two different meanings of 
alternative emerge in the process. 
Marxist-inspired scholarship has been especially critical of the 
economics of carbon valuation and has stressed especially the social 
limits to its scope. It has discussed how carbon has been incorporated 
into the capitalist world system, which has revealed the contradictory 
aspects of the alternatives created through these processes (see 
especially McMichael 2009; Lohmann 2010). For example, when the 
carbon credit is objectified as the means of finding alternative ways of 
organising the economy in order to mitigate global warming, it is 
presented as an alternative to accepting the current economic 
conditions that lead to climate change, and it is a way of perceiving the 
curbing of emissions through market-driven procedures as an 
alternative to state-organised taxation or command-and-control 
mechanisms (see Bumpus and Liverman 2008: 131). Yet with carbon 
valuation being at the centre of climate capitalism (Newell and 
Paterson 2010), it is embedded in an alternative variant of the 
contemporary economic system rather than proposing an alternative to 
it (e.g. Lohmann 2010; Dalsgaard 2013).   6
 See n. 4 (Berntsen et al. 2006).5
 One could argue that Marxists generally have propagated visions of society based 6
on radical and revolutionary alternatives rather than accepting mere variants.
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Carbon valuation offers to make everything commensurable in its 
own terms (Dalsgaard 2013), but what about other terms? That is 
exactly the problem that emerges from positing carbon as an 
alternative valuation; it has been criticised by some scholars (e.g. 
Lohmann 2010) as posing as a quasi or even a pseudo-alternative—an 
alternative ‘green’ capitalism perhaps, but not an alternative to 
capitalism; carbon valuation schemes rely on one meaning but not the 
other. These critical scholars stress how carbon trading embodies the 
characteristics of uncertainty markets and risky financial products such 
as derivatives (Cooper 2010; Lohmann 2010; Spash 2010); it permits 
societies in the global north to maintain luxurious lifestyles and to rely 
upon fossil fuel-based unlimited growth rather than turning them 
towards the ‘true’ alternatives of recycling and renewable energy 
(Lohmann 2009a, 2010; see also McMichael 2009); it turns nature 
into an object that can generate profit (e.g. Knox-Hayes 2010), and 
comparing ‘old and new carbon economies […] redraws the boundary 
of the “carbon problem”: climate change becomes no longer an 
emission problem or a sequestration problem, but one of carbon 
throughput’ (Bridge 2010: 822), or one of managing fluctuation within 
the climate as much as within the economy (Cooper 2010).  
Both the view of carbon valuation as posing quasi- or pseudo-
alternatives and the challenge with the emphasis on fluctuation or 
throughput become even clearer when it comes to the potential 
substitution of different mundane actions based on their cost in carbon 
emissions. Comparing the use of a microwave oven with the use of 
public transport is a pseudo- rather than a quasi-substitution. It is 
merely illustrative of the scale of emissions, and it is probably only 
intended as such; but by comparing the two it is also implied that one 
can make up for one’s transport-based emissions by dropping some 
other—meaningful—activity. But who would—in his or her everyday 
life—be confronted with the choice of exchanging or sacrificing the use 
of a microwave for the privilege of driving a car rather than using 
public transport? Carbon valuation and in particular the carbon credit 
here exemplifies a scheme, which enforces connection, commensur-
ation and pricing of ‘events, states or goods that are not 
commensurated or priced in everyday life’ (e.g. Lohmann 2009b: 522). 
Everyday actions like these are meaningful in relation to multiple 
cultural or social concerns and networks; they are often (radically) 
different without being substitutable. 
If all carbon emissions according to economic discourse are 
commensurable and replaceable (any quantified emission negated is 
equal to any other emission of the same type and quantity), the 
question is how to identify the relationship between this understanding 
of carbon as generic (and universal) and the actualised and specific 
understandings of carbon emitting actions valued in different contexts 
and networks or being transformed as it crosses boundaries. Maurer’s 
Carbon Valuation        77
exploration of money as a parallel also notes how one line of thought 
(e.g. Georg Simmel) sees money as homogenising ‘acid’ that erodes 
human values, whereas others (such as Vivian Zelizer) ‘draw attention 
to the myriad kinds and multiple effects of money‘ (Maurer 2005: 
103). That is, if we see and expect to see carbon emissions and thus 
carbon valuation everywhere, the danger is that we easily end up 
glossing over the incongruent and incommensurable capacities that 
may emerge when exchanging different discursive or biological carbon 
compounds one for another. When these carbon compounds 
correspond to or represent each their own set of mundane actions, one 
then trades a congealed or contractual form of the actions or activities 
in question, when trading credits. However, trading actions in this 
congealed form as carbon offsets or credits illustrates how the moral 
values, which are associated with carbon reductions in one location 
(consumers or corporations eager for good conscience or PR), become 
‘disentangled’ from their local context, when they are turned into a 
delimited commodity (see Thomas 1991). This is not to imply in a 
simple manner that some actions are moral and others not, but merely 
to state there may be multiple moralities attached to or detached from 
actions at any given time, and they shift through processes of exchange 
or commoditisation. The carbon markets have, nonetheless, brought 
about what seems to many observers to be bizarre emission reduction 
schemes. When the reduction for instance is based in rural India on the 
substitution of manually operated treadle water pumps for diesel-
driven ones, then the abstracted substitution of emissions is accused of 
transmuting into a morally problematic discursive guise of ‘luxury 
emissions’ versus ‘survival emissions’ as Agarwal and Narain (1991) 
famously named it, or as ‘bearing the white man’s burden’ as an Indian 
newspaper stated (Blok 2010: 20). Other examples include carbon 
funding for hydropower dams that destroy sustainable and low-
emission local systems of water control and irrigation (Lohmann 
2009a: 1070‒1071), or oil palm plantations or similar mono-cropping 
that replaces rainforest based on the view that palm trees also absorb 
carbon from the atmosphere (Creagh 2010).  
While substitutable on paper, not all emission reductions are 
attractive to western consumers and corporations, when what they 
want is to save the rainforest and its biodiversity, or improve health in 
the global south by introducing fuel-efficient ‘clean cookstoves’ to poor 
households so they need less firewood and the housewives do not 
inhale as much smoke from firewood (see Peters-Stanley and Gonzalez 
2014: xiv). Where both of these examples play with the avoidance of 
negative alternative futures (no more rainforest; deterioration of poor 
people’s health—disregarding the likelihood that such futures may 
occur anyhow), carbon trading here poses another level of alternative 
by being juxtaposed to and substituting for exchange relations 
between global north and global south in the field of development. 
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Climate change mitigation and environmental policy is deeply 
integrated in this field today, where ‘non-carbon benefits’ was in focus 
at least prior to COP21 in Paris in December 2015. In fact, carbon 
offsetting does not appear to be much about the carbon but all about 
the other values that carbon-reducing projects realise or actualise (such 
as the relationship between humans and nature or living a ‘green’ 
consumer lifestyle). Attachment to such ‘other values’ is one of the 
parameters, which differentiates alternate types of carbon units or 
credits from each other (see Dalsgaard 2014).  
While the use of carbon valuation for alternative ends thus seems 
abundant, debates about policies and market structures still only 
address a limited view of the alternative forms which emerge from the 
carbon valuation schemes. My argument is that when shifting focus to 
the actual and practical construction of carbon credits or emission 
allowances, it becomes clear that they rely on the manipulation of 
‘alternatives’ at another more technical and sometimes material level—
that of the credit itself. 
Carbon Valuation and Cer t i f icat ion:  
What is the Mater ial i ty of Credits? 
The value and alleged reality of carbon emission reductions expressed 
through carbon credits depends to a high extent on the work of 
certification. This section will go into some detail with this work, since 
the topic touches upon the way the ‘reality’ and commensurate 
potential of carbon is ensured through either its informational or its 
material forms, and whether these forms are regarded as substitutable 
or not. This paves the way for a discussion of effects and adequacy of 
credits valuation in the final section.  
An important aspect of carbon valuation is the distinction between 
different kinds of credits. While all credits on paper are the same and 
nominally refer to an emission reduction of one tonne of CO2e, some 
credits are more highly regarded than others, because it is deemed 
more likely (in part due to more rigorous certifications) that they 
adequately represent this. Different credit types can thus be seen as 
variants of the same kind, ideally substitutable for one another, but in 
practice they are valued differently and even carry different prices, 
which again means that commensuration is not straightforward or 
meets resistance even within the system of market valuation. 
The categorisation made in financial accounting is one way of 
establishing the relation between credits, their degree of sameness or 
difference, and whether they can be substituted for each other or not, 
or through which factor of conversion (see Lovell 2014). Certification 
methodologies lie behind how the credits are made in practice. 
Certification not only claims to guarantee that a credit refers to a ‘real’ 
emission reduction, it also establishes differentiation between the 
different types of credits that all depend on different relationships as to 
Carbon Valuation        79
how their reductions have come about, and how likely are their 
‘realities’. Where for instance the credits named Certified Emission 
Reductions (CERs) have to live up to standards ensuring that it is 
appropriate for trading in the strictly regulated compliance markets, 
Verified Emission Reductions, or Voluntary Emission Reductions 
(VERs) as they are also called, are made for voluntary markets, where 
there are fewer requirements. 
The difference between voluntary and compliance markets and 
their respective credits has been reviewed extensively in the literature, 
including discussions of the different types of emission reducing 
projects and the making of standards (e.g. Bumpus and Liverman 
2008; Corbera et al. 2009; Lovell et al. 2009; Lovell and Liverman 
2010; Lovell 2014). The main point for my case is that the valuation 
employs different but comparable knowledge-making practices that 
make different claims about the relationship between carbon credits 
and reduced emissions. Heather Lovell and Diana Liverman (2010) 
have argued that credits for the compliance markets are largely 
constructed from the calculative practices of accounting with little or 
no trace of the conditions by which they are produced (cf. MacKenzie 
2009), whereas credits in the voluntary markets often retain a link 
across the supply chain to the site of production in order to allow 
narratives to promote the buyer’s ethical profile (see Lovell et al. 
2009). Examples of the latter are credits referring to clean cookstoves 
or forest carbon sinks, which are popular because they appear tangible 
and are easy to communicate to the buyer (Stephan 2012). 
Consequently, some scholars have argued that all types of carbon 
credits are constructed as commodities purely from information (e.g. 
Knox-Hayes 2013: 122). The underlying reason for this is that the 
carbon credit is not a physical or material commodity, but a 
representation of an event or action that affects materiality. The credit 
is thus a certificate that documents that this has happened, or rather 
has not happened, and that ‘something equivalent’ is allowed to 
happen. Carbon credits claim to be a reflection or representation of 
emission reductions, or non-existing emissions. As such they have no 
physical manifestation except in infrastructures as for example 
exchange platforms or registries, where they can be identified by a 
unique serial number (Knox-Hayes 2010: 957‒958). In this regard, the 
certified credit has parallels to legal contracts as mentioned in the 
introduction and in the previous section (that is, an exchange of 
conditional actions materialised or congealed in information such as 
ledgers, formulations and signatures), and legal scholars have been 
active in interpreting the frameworks for the carbon markets and their 
products (e.g. Hepburn 2007).  
Carbon credit information consists of the mapping of an alleged 
physical reality that affects the amount and value of the credits. It is 
for instance well documented how carbon emitters such as 
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corporations (e.g. Lippert 2012, 2015) and carbon reduction projects 
(e.g. Ehrenstein and Muniesa 2013) basically claim to construct 
carbon emissions based on information about material assets and their 
use. This can be information that accounts for the polluting activities 
of a corporation that seeks to offset its emissions, or it can be 
information based or on the mapping of rainforest ‘carbon sinks’ (e.g. 
Stephan 2012; Ehrenstein and Muniesa 2013). However, even for 
credits referring to a clear image of a material reality, it is rather the 
counterfactual labour or actions that are done or not done to this 
material reality, which generates the value of the credits, which is why 
information (calculation as well as narratives) is so important (see 
Muniesa 2012; Lippert 2015).  
Different types of markets and credits demand different forms of 
information, which in turn informs different modes of carbon 
valuation. Lovell and Liverman argue that ‘information and knowledge 
about how the offset is produced—where and using what technology
—is crucial within the voluntary offset market, in stark contrast to the 
compliance market where this type of information is actively 
dissociated from the credit’ (2010: 260). The work to represent the 
reality of emission reductions within the voluntary markets includes 
attempts to present it in an almost customised form as ‘boutique 
offsets’ to consumers in the global north who are presented with and 
demanding ethical narratives of the good that offsets do even if 
misrepresenting the realities of how the credits are produced (Lovell et 
al. 2009; see also Ehrenstein and Muniesa 2013: 179). Apart from the 
different carbon ‘units’ (e.g. credits such as the CER or VER) subject to 
individual rules depending on which market the carbon is traded in 
(e.g. Button 2008: 573‒574), there were besides that in 2009 at least 
18 different standards  for offsets, each claiming to guarantee the 7
value of a unit and integrating its own gamut of social and 
environmental benefits, land use or forestry (Newell and Paterson 
2010: 120‒121; Descheneau 2012: 605). The voluntary markets are 
less strict in terms of certifications, but ‘the offset narratives and 
technologies also act to reassure consumers about what it is they are 
buying, given the absence of both a tangible product and regulatory 
standards’ (Lovell et al. 2009: 2358). In other words, adequacy may 
here refer to detailed stories rather than to accuracy in the 
methodologies behind the measurement of emissions. 
The requirements and thereby the information needed to certify or 
verify a tonne of carbon usually focus on the capacity of projects to 
produce or store carbon. Focus is on the technical drafting of a project 
 This is not the same as the different emissions units such as AAUs (Assigned 7
Amount Units), ERUs (Emission Reduction Units) and CERs (see e.g. Hepburn 2007: 
380; Yamin 2005). There are today at least nine different standards for offsets (see 
http://www.carbonneutral.com/resource-hub/carbon-offsetting-explained/carbon-
offset-standards, accessed April 4 2016).
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design document (PDD) which delineates (spatially as well as 
temporally) the project aimed at carrying out the reduction changes, 
calculates credible baselines or ‘reference scenarios’ to which the 
project will be compared, and estimates the carbon credits to be 
produced (Ehrenstein and Muniesa 2013). This work is done in order 
to argue and to make it plausible that the reduction is additional to a 
certain ‘business as usual’ scenario; in other words, what would 
emissions be like in the absence of the project? In this respect, the 
project design introduces the agency of some human individual or 
group, which earns the credits by changing a course of action, and it is 
the promise of this alternative course of action that provides both the 
reality and the value of the carbon credit. Note that project designers 
claim that additionality refers to ‘alternative’ in the sense of ‘radically 
different’ by promising a singular future that would otherwise not 
have come about rather than merely substituting one course of action 
for another. 
The notion of additionality as an ‘estimate of expected emission 
reductions’ (Hepburn 2007: 381) provides food for thought here, 
because it stretches carbon valuation conceptually to both temporal 
and spatial limits. Additionality is very difficult to prove, and it is 
largely hypothetical in its reference to a business as usual scenario (e.g. 
Bumpus and Liverman 2008: 135‒136); a calculation projected 
forward in time for the duration of the project based on known 
conditions of the past and comparisons to similarly contemporary 
scenarios. Critics would argue that the counterfactual alternative is 
thus often inadequate if not directly spurious, even if it is treated as 
having the same epistemic status as actual histories of emissions (e.g. 
Lohmann 2011). For a forest carbon project the expected growth rate 
of the relevant species of trees combined with vegetation density, soil 
nutrients, hours of sunlight and many other factors must be known or 
estimated for the specific location of the project (cf. Stephan 2012). 
The valuation itself is furthermore delicate, because the carbon credit 
is what occurs in excess of the natural absorption of atmospheric 
carbon by vegetation and soil, or it must be demonstrated that the 
project actively ensures a growth process that otherwise would be 
averted (Gutiérrez 2012: 53). It must also be guaranteed that the 
activities or processes that emit carbon are indeed averted and not just 
relocated, outsourced or exported. In the carbon project jargon this is 
called ‘leakage’ (Gutiérrez 2012: 54, see also Davis and Caldeira 
2010). In other words, what is valuable is not any existing carbon, but 
would-be carbon; carbon that would or should have been emitted but 
was not. In some cases it exists in the mapping of carbon sinks—the 
storage of carbon—which is compared to the counterfactual and 
imagined alternative event that it will be released and would have been 
emitted unless some developer paid to conserve it. Emission reductions 
here become a virtual resource; not ‘not-real’ but not actualised either. 
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It is always implied (if not always demonstrated) that carbon 
credits correspond to a substantial and material reality—both spatially 
and temporally present at a given duration in time for reversing 
emissions already done or for offsetting potential emissions in the 
future (see Bumpus 2012). The ‘hot air’ mentioned above is one 
example, though, where the materiality and reality of reductions is 
questioned, and the value of these credits is derived from an 
intergovernmental agreement. But also for other credits there can be 
doubt. Some of the more ideological positions on the US dollar lament 
that its value is no longer being fixed to and backed by the ‘reality’ of 
gold (Maurer 2005: 89), and similarly the centrality of the work of 
auditors and verifiers could indicate that the value of carbon credits 
depends on the social or socio-technical production of trust and 
signification rather than on actual material carbon (cf. Lovell 2014: 
266). Indeed a patch of forest can be converted into potential carbon 
credits through documentation, so the materiality is not unimportant 
for adequacy of the representation and it functions as a persuasive 
aesthetic in the marketing of credits; but it is often far removed from 
what is being traded. 
Having said that, from the perspective of ‘social studies of 
finance’ (see MacKenzie 2008), materiality is more important than 
usually imagined by those arguing that the value of carbon credits is 
purely informational or government fiat. Materiality in this view is not 
so much the ‘reality’ of the carbon-materiality that the credits strive to 
represent, or how the credits are embedded in an imaginary of the 
fluctuation of atoms and molecules in and out of the atmosphere. For 
the everyday practices of the actors involved, the point is more 
importantly how carbon (credits as much as emissions) is located 
materially in socio-technical infrastructures or objects that do not 
simply ‘represent’ a market, but is a constitutive part of economic 
action (ibid.: 3). Markets and their actors have materiality—
physicality, corporeality and technicality—and both prices and credits 
take physical form. Credits are located and must be stored and moved 
through writing and electronic signals (ibid.: 2). These include online 
carbon calculators (Lovell et al. 2009) or spreadsheets for corporate 
carbon accounting, which constructs carbon emissions in need of 
offsetting (Lippert 2012, 2015). On the credit side, they include 
windmills that generate power (cf. Phadke 2012), and oil or coal that 
contain potential emissions (cf. Mitchell 2011), but also the 
technological infrastructures or ‘datascapes’ (Lippert 2015) that enable 
calculations and trading. These can be PDDs, registries and other 
digital and technological means of exchanging the credits with speed 
and efficiency, which keeps track of the lifecycle of the credit including 
origin, trading history and expiry (Knox-Hayes 2013: 124). Knox-
Hayes emphasises the problem of how to locate the ‘reality’ and the 
value of carbon, though, in that ‘the markets seem to instantly create 
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global scale and tremendous value, because they create value for events 
absent space and time, and it is therefore difficult if not impossible to 
ascertain the place and scale at which the value actually exists’ (Knox-
Hayes 2013: 124). Valuation, and the adequacy of that valuation, is 
thus distributed upon a diversity of materialities and actions as much 
as virtualities and non-actions, which means that both the 
actualisation of its ‘reality’ and value is constantly emerging and 
changing, and difficult to locate. 
What this section has demonstrated is that alternations between 
materialisations of carbon and information about carbon exist in a 
complex but mutually reinforcing relationship of potential alternatives, 
and that carbon is difficult to ‘locate’ as its status and hence location 
can be mobile in the physical as much as the socio-technical world. 
Along with socio-technical infrastructures, certification work with its 
focus on additionality and counterfactuals in project design provides 
attempts to stabilise the alternation, to ensure the process of 
substitutability between alternatives (such as different types of credits). 
Yet it is argued by critics to contain a spurious assumption of actual 
and virtual emissions being equivalent, due to the uncertainties of 
what counts as ‘additional’ or what reality can be ascribed to a 
counterfactual. This brings us to the question of ‘adequacy’ of the 
representation of the alternative and virtual scenarios potentially 
substituted through the carbon credit. This is an aspect of carbon 
valuation, where Maurer’s work on the adequacy of alternative 
currencies provides a useful starting point. 
Debating the Adequacy and  
the Ef fect of Carbon Valuation  
Maurer’s project is to study alternatives to modern money and finance 
as they are envisioned and made in practice by a wide range of actors. 
His analysis is intertwined with reasoning and ‘everyday 
understandings of money among people who are forging their own 
modes of finance through Islamic banking and non-state-based 
alternative currencies’ (2005: xiii); people who have been active in 
trying to rediscover in practice the relation of money to ‘reality’, so it 
can be ‘re-grounded’ and (again) conform to social order whether it be 
faith, community or law (Maurer 2005: 6‒7). Not disregarding the 
difficult philosophical problem of how to approach or discuss what 
reality ‘is’, I take inspiration from Maurer’s lateral way of addressing 
it, which is to focus on how the carbon value debate is concerned with 
the practical ‘adequacy’ of the representation; how to bring ‘one’s 
concepts in accord with reality’ (ibid.: xiii).  
How adequacy is an empirical matter of debate for this topic is 
exemplified by the discussions over the establishment of standards for 
carbon credits in the financial accounting mentioned above (Lovell 
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2014). The desire to make value ‘real’ and to make ‘the real’ valuable 
has a parallel in carbon valuation. To be valuable, a carbon credit must 
be certified as representing one tonne of CO2e—a carbon reduction 
that is ‘real, measurable and additional’ (Hepburn 2007: 381), which I 
touched on in the previous section. Suffice it to say here that the 
carbon emissions represented by a credit should exist as an effect 
somewhere ‘in the real world’, outside the circulation of finance with 
its credits, allowances and offset units on paper. Such references to 
reality should be taken seriously as empirical phenomena that have an 
effect in themselves. Whether and how this carbon and its effect ‘out 
there’ exists is an ongoing debate, which has generated an industry of 
carbon auditors doing calculations, measurements, risk assessments, 
certification, verification, monitoring and reporting of practices in 
terms of their alleged emissions or non-emissions. 
A fundamental insight here is to appreciate that carbon valuation 
schemes, like other economic schemes, in Donald MacKenzie’s (2006) 
terms operate as ‘engines’ rather than as ‘cameras’. Economic theory 
assumes that economic models depict or represent a detached reality. A 
more adequate perspective here would be to say that the valuation 
schemes are implicated in this reality; they form it and bring its 
shifting meanings into being (see also Maurer 2005: 53). This 
perspective allows for the dual meaning of ‘alternative’, and the effort 
of connecting value and ‘reality’ is shared by those multiple actors 
trying to figure out how to appreciate carbon in whatever form it 
appears in their everyday lives whether on paper, in trees, in energy 
consumption or something else. Frequently this relation is highly 
uncertain and disputed. Carbon valuation schemes involve attempts by 
multiple social actors to understand, interpret and value the world 
they live in, as much as it is an academic exercise based upon multiple 
forms of (disciplinary) knowledge including law, accounting, 
economics, biology, sociology and much more. In such a case and with 
such an object of study, the anthropologist can work laterally 
alongside the interpretations and social constructs of both scholars and 
lay people. The anthropologist investigates their explorations of 
carbon valuation to evoke the relevant meaning-making efforts, and to 
show how these efforts give rise to the tensions between different 
understandings of alternative. 
The problem of how to value carbon credits, and conversely what 
carbon credits value, thus touches upon similar processes of valuation 
as the alternative currencies described by Maurer, and several scholars 
have attempted to make this comparison (e.g. Victor and House 2004; 
Button 2008; Descheneau 2012; Dalsgaard 2013). In what ways are 
carbon credits ‘adequate’ as signs in relation to the value backing 
them; whether value largely stems from government fiat and 
signification (as in compliance markets), from market demand or 
‘desire’ (when traded as offsets in voluntary markets), or from material 
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existence in nature and in the affordances of the substance in question 
(industrial emission measurements, storages in vegetation or in soil or 
certified reductions from development projects)? While critiques of 
carbon credits’ efficiency in addressing climate change mostly comes 
from Marxist-inspired scholars, environmental activists and supporters 
of renewables (e.g. Lohmann 2010), the question of what is ‘really’ 
valued with a carbon credit does occupy the entire carbon trading 
industry. Where Maurer notes that ‘scholars across the disciplines are 
continuously surprised to discover that money is ‘just’ meaning, or that 
finance is fiction’ (2005: xiv), the problem seems to be the opposite for 
carbon. Policymakers, journalists and scholars alike have at least 
during the early days of carbon markets questioned both the 
soundness and the effects of carbon trading with metaphorical 
references to how carbon credits’ value came out of ‘thin air’ due to 
the uncertainty of the definitions and measurements that back them up 
(Gutiérrez 2012), or that it was the trading of ‘hot air’. ‘Hot air’ has 
referred either to an oversupply of dubious claims to reductions from 
projects in the global south (Michaelowa 2005: 298) or more 
frequently to the inflated allocations of emission allowances given for 
free to industries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union as 
part of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (Anderson and Bradley 2005; see also 
Grubb 2003: 166‒167; Button 2008: 584‒585; Spash 2010: 179).  
Many of those involved, however, do believe in the work that is 
being done, and in other instances (the making of counterfactual 
baselines and modelling for estimating forest carbon) valuation 
practices have become naturalised and are by now taken for granted in 
many circles (Stephan 2012). Judging from the amount of work that 
goes into discussions for instance among financial accountants trying 
to identify standards for carbon credits (Lovell 2014), it may be that 
carbon trading in general has become an accepted policy and practice 
for adequately dealing with climate change in many circles; but the 
making of credits and how to deal with them remains a challenging 
and constantly evolving issue, because of the problematic and 
sometimes inadequate relationship between effect (in emissions) and 
representation of that effect (in credits).  
Conclusion 
This article has discussed how carbon valuation and its comparisons 
are interpreted through different registers of alternatives, and how this 
means that potential or virtual scenarios for emissions come to be 
valued as equal to actual and real emissions (including the actions and 
objects causing them). Contestations over carbon’s value revolve 
around interpretations of these claims to alternatives as either 
substitutions or as radical differences. Carbon valuation provides 
alternative imaginaries in many respects (an alternative capitalism, 
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alternative ideals for consumption, etc.), and as a market system it 
commodifies and trades in alternatives (alternative nature, alternative 
counterfactual reality, etc.), which can be interpreted either as 
genuinely different courses of action that avoid emissions or as mere 
substitutions of speculative courses of action for real emissions. When 
pushing the alternatives to their limits, it becomes clear how practices 
that emit carbon sometimes become construed as alternatives across 
what claim to be incommensurable criteria and along imaginaries that 
are detached from cultural practices of everyday life.  
The alignment of alternatives is both the most promising aspect of 
carbon valuation as a way for a social scientist to understand how 
carbon markets are presented as solutions to climate change and the 
most problematic—socially as much as technically—for the actors 
involved in reaching any such solutions. As with discussions of 
commensuration (Espeland and Stevens 1998) it is promising because 
it allows for comparisons and exchanges, and is problematic because 
those comparisons and exchanges gloss over differences that cannot be 
transferred without distortion. Also the potential for carbon markets 
to produce new alternatives has been debated by academics from 
different disciplines. Some have thought that putting a price on carbon 
emissions would spur on entrepreneurs to innovate in order to earn 
money on selling carbon credits through better and ‘greener’ 
technology; but critics have argued that carbon trading provided 
incentives not to develop innovation and alternatives amid those 
industries that can just pay their way out ‒ those energy industries 
where it may be needed most (Lohmann 2009b: 507). 
Much of the criticism of carbon valuation schemes has been 
levelled at commensuration as a common metric of quantification (e.g. 
MacKenzie 2009). It may not be the quantification as such that is the 
problem, though, but that carbon valuation quantifies actions, rights 
and objects that emerge as incommensurable and perhaps even 
‘priceless’. For example, one could speculate that carbon valuation 
ignores how human actions can be tied closely to preservation of the 
self, with identities, and that the practices that are valued in terms of 
carbon emissions can be perceived as ‘inalienable’ to individuals and 
groups (see Weiner 1992; Godelier 1999). This does not work for all 
actions, of course, but many are so habitually ingrained to a sense of 
self that they are hard to exchange for some alternative. Carbon 
trading also potentially values carbon emissions morally as part of 
‘nature’. Carbon is at the centre of conflicting ideas about 'the nature 
of nature'—in particular nature as object versus nature as (sacred) 
subject to which can be ascribed a certain inalienability that emerges 
as an effect of the commodification of nature. Then the alternative 
becomes one of resistance or one that engenders resistance. By 
constructing alternatives, carbon valuation does not only make 
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potential substitutions—it also creates alternatives as radically 
different.  
The discussions of carbon valuation are not likely to close any time 
soon despite apparent failures of the carbon markets to mitigate 
climate change (Stephan and Lane 2014). Perhaps there is little point, 
though, in assuming that the actors involved are trying to build an 
alternative ‘perfect market’ or construct an alternative global currency 
out of carbon credits (cf. Button 2008). It may be more important to 
recognise along the lines of valuation analysed by Bill Maurer (2005) 
how these actors strive to create ‘adequacy’ between the (carbon) 
valuation schemes, and the environmental costs of the activities in 
which we as humans are engaged, even if that is also in their view in 
some ways an impossible and never-ending endeavour. Achieving 
complete fungibility of carbon credits would break down radical 
differences, but it seems that other actors in response are trying to 
place boundaries around the relevant markets by ‘stipulating zones of 
the incommensurable through social institutions, laws and informal 
practices’ (Gudeman 2008: 161). Numerous actors have vested 
interests in valuing carbon, and instead of assuming that the 
discussions will reach an end point, they may entail an ever-expanding 
set of markets as new forms of carbon valuation are invented through 
laterally circulating experiments with nature, climate and the 
environment. 
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